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Essay
ABOLISHING THE AMERICAN DEATH
PENALTY: THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION
VERSUS THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker *
I. INTRODUCTION
The American death penalty is newly fragile. About two decades ago,
death sentences and executions reached their modern era highs and
capital punishment seemed to be an entrenched part of the criminal justice
system. Thirty-eight states and the federal government had capital
statutes on the books, and political actors at all levels seemed committed
to accelerating executions.
Emblematic of this commitment was
Congress’s passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, which limited federal habeas corpus review of state and federal
prisoners with the hope of reducing the time between sentence and
execution. But the last fifteen years or so have seen an extraordinary
withering of the death penalty. 1 Six jurisdictions have legislatively
abandoned capital punishment, with several others on the cusp of doing
so. Executions have declined over seventy percent, from their 1999 high
of ninety-eight to a low of twenty last year.2 Those executions are
increasingly confined to a handful of states and to a handful of counties
within those states.
Death sentences have dropped even more
dramatically, from a high of 315 per year nationwide in 1996 to a low last
year of 30—over a 90 percent decline.3 Other indications of the weakening
of the death penalty abound. Public support for the death penalty, as
reflected in opinion polls, has declined substantially over the past twentyfive years.4 At its recent convention in advance of the 2016 presidential
election, the Democratic Party included abolition of the death penalty in
Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Judge Robert M. Parker
Endowed Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law. This Essay is based on the Tabor
Lecture given at Valparaiso University Law School.
1
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
2
See Executions by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions-year [https://perma.cc/24DK-GAUY].
3
See Death Sentences by Year Since 1976, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/death-sentences-year-1977-present [https://perma.cc/2FUN-US3S].
4
See Death Penalty Trends, GALLUP INC., http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/deathpenalty.aspx [https://perma.cc/BT2B-S52A] (reflecting 60% support for death penalty for
the crime of murder in October 2015, compared to 75–80% in the years 1988–1995).
*
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the party platform for the first time. Over the past several years, even
some conservative, evangelical, and victims-advocate groups have voiced
their opposition to capital punishment.5
In light of these developments, the most apt questions surrounding
the American death penalty seem to be when and how, rather than whether
the death penalty will be abolished. Given our federal structure, the only
real prospect for nationwide abolition is a decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court finding the practice unconstitutional. Over four decades ago, the
Court came close to ending the death penalty in 1972, when it found all
prevailing statutes unconstitutional. 6 Four years later, the Court upheld
many new statutes passed in the wake of its decision.7 Since that time, the
Court has developed a complicated series of doctrines regulating the
operation of the American death penalty but has stopped short of finding
the practice unconstitutional. Increasingly though, Justices on the Court
have indicated a willingness to revisit the broader issue of the
constitutionality of the death penalty writ large. 8
What would constitutional abolition look like? This Essay focuses on
the surprising disconnect between some of the most powerful anti-death
penalty arguments in the public arena and the arguments most likely to
prevail in the Court. Three central abolitionist arguments have had
enormous traction among opponents of the death penalty, yet each has
fared poorly in Supreme Court decisions and none are likely to provide a
dispositive, independent basis for constitutional abolition going forward.
The first of these arguments concerns racial discrimination in the
administration of the American death penalty. Concerns about racial
discrimination were at the forefront of the efforts to regulate and restrict
capital punishment in the 1960s, but the Supreme Court declined in
numerous cases to hold that discriminatory application of capital
punishment requires judicial intervention, much less abolition. 9
Constitutional abolition is thus unlikely to rest on the troubling and
continuing role of race in the American capital system. The second major
ground of attack focuses on the problem of wrongful convictions and

See CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME COURT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 215–16 (2016) (discussing opposition to the death penalty by
George Will, murder victims’ families, Kansas college Republicans, and evangelical
Christians).
6
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972).
7
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (upholding Georgia’s guided
discretion scheme).
8
See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2795 (2015) (Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
9
See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The American Death Penalty and the (In)Visibility
of Race, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 244 (2015) [hereinafter Steiker & Steiker, Race].
5
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executions. The discovery of numerous innocents on death row in the late
1990s is often credited as a major turning point in the stability of the
American death penalty, and concerns about wrongful convictions are
perhaps the most frequently voiced grounds in contemporary public
discourse for jettisoning capital punishment. But the Supreme Court has
rejected the idea that federal courts should police the accuracy of capital
convictions, refusing to endorse the basic proposition that the
Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted inmate who later
uncovers evidence disproving or substantially undermining his or her
guilt.10 The Court’s lack of solicitude for the claims of wrongfully
condemned inmates suggests that the Court is unlikely to hold that
inaccuracy in the capital system fatally undermines its constitutional
status. The third and most ubiquitous ground for attacking capital
punishment rests on some version of human dignity. Concerns about the
inhumanity of the death penalty have dominated opposition to capital
punishment since the Enlightenment era, both in the United States and
around the world. Opposition rooted in human dignity encompasses a
number of related but distinct claims, including the assertion that capital
punishment denies the worth of the individual, creates an unacceptable
power in the State, treats offenders as means rather than ends, and
imposes excessive suffering. These types of attacks on the death penalty
have been voiced throughout American history, from the earliest days of
the anti-gallows movement to the advocacy of contemporary abolitionist
groups, such as the National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty.
Arguments about human dignity provided the most important grounds
for abolition in the vast majority of jurisdictions around the world that
have jettisoned capital punishment, especially in Europe, and they remain
the most compelling and salient bases for challenging the death penalty in
continuing efforts to abolish it worldwide. Claims of human dignity,
though, have had far less traction in the U.S. courts, particularly the
Supreme Court. Although litigants in the 1960s and 1970s pressed the
Court to find the death penalty violative of human dignity, the Court
sidestepped such an approach and instead focused on the administration
of the death penalty rather than its fundamental justice. When it upheld
new capital statutes in 1976, it declared that the choice to retain capital
punishment belonged to the states, holding that the practice could be
justified on retributive or deterrence grounds. Since that time, the Court
has scarcely mentioned claims of human dignity, even as it has faced
challenges to dubious execution methods. If the Court were to address
and endorse a categorical challenge to the death penalty, it would be

10

See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
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unlikely to rest its case primarily on the intrinsic value of human life or
the impermissibility of state involvement in killing.
The first part of this Essay illustrates the ways in which concerns
about racial discrimination, wrongful conviction, and human dignity have
been marginalized within the Court’s extensive constitutional regulation
of the death penalty. The second portion traces the Court’s most likely
path to constitutional abolition given prevailing capital jurisprudence and
the subordinate—but still significant—role of such concerns within that
jurisprudence.
II. PATHS NOT TAKEN
A. Racial Discrimination
The American death penalty has always been tainted by racial
discrimination. In the antebellum South, the use of capital punishment
was closely allied with the slave economy that had been established in the
colonial era.11 Capital offenses included crimes against slavery, such as
encouraging slaves to escape or rise up against their masters. Execution
methods employed against slaves were particularly gruesome, mirroring
the especially harsh treatment reserved for those convicted of treason in
England and elsewhere given the existential threat posed by such
offending.12 Southern capital codes made the availability of the death
penalty turn on the racial characteristics or slave status of the offender and
victim.13 South Carolina, for example, made it a capital crime for slaves to
maim or even “bruise” a white person. In the antebellum period, race and
capital punishment were mutually reinforcing, in that race influenced the
administration of the death penalty and the death penalty helped cement
and give significance to racial identity.
After the Civil War, the explicit use of race in state capital statutes
disappeared, but racial discrimination permeated every aspect of capital
proceedings, from the initial criminal investigation (including methods
used to elicit confessions), to charging decisions, jury selection,
appointment of defense counsel, presentation of evidence, prosecutorial
tactics, sentencing proceedings, appeals, and the availability of clemency.
In addition, antagonism toward the newly-freed black population
produced a generation of extra-legal executions in the form of lynching.
More blacks were lynched in the two decades spanning 1885-1905 (close
to 2,000) than the total number of persons executed in the United States

11
12
13

See Steiker & Steiker, Race, supra note 9, at 245.
See id. at 246.
See id. at 248.
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over the past fifty years (approaching 1,500).14 As lynching declined by
the late 1920s, executions climbed. The summary legal proceedings
afforded black defendants in capital cases earned the sobriquet “legal
lynching.” Many capital trials in the South were conducted without even
a pretense of fairness, in some cases with a mob at the courthouse steps or
even in the courtroom itself. The discriminatory administration of the
death penalty was perhaps most evident in capital rape cases. An
overwhelming percentage of those sentenced and executed for rape in the
twentieth century were black defendants convicted of raping white
victims; all such executions after the 1920s were confined to southern
states and the District of Columbia.15
By the 1960s, concerns about racial discrimination were a central part
of the critique of the American death penalty. In 1963, when three Justices
on the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time suggested that the death
penalty might be constitutionally excessive as applied to certain offenders,
they chose rape cases from the South in which blacks had been sentenced
to die for the rape of white victims.16 Justice Arthur Goldberg, writing a
dissent from the Court’s decision to deny certiorari, suggested that the
Court should decide whether the death penalty is disproportionate for the
offense of rape. The original draft of Goldberg’s dissent highlighted the
manifest racial discrimination in such cases, but at the urging of Chief
Justice Earl Warren, his discussion of race was omitted in his published
opinion.17 That opinion nonetheless triggered the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) Legal Defense Fund
(“LDF”) to include abolition of capital punishment as part of its ongoing
portfolio of racial justice causes, alongside its efforts to desegregate
schools, end discrimination in housing and employment, and ensure
voting opportunities. Over the next decades, the LDF invested enormous
resources in capital litigation, becoming the most prominent abolitionist
group in the United States. The LDF began its efforts by commissioning
empirical research to document the role of race in Southern rape cases. By
the late 1960s, the LDF had successfully pursued a moratorium strategy
that brought executions in the United States to a halt and set the stage for
the Supreme Court to address the constitutionality of the death penalty.

See Classroom: Lynchings, by Year and Race, 1882–1968, CHARLES CHESTNUT DIGITAL
ARCHIVE,
http://www.chesnuttarchive.org/classroom/lynching_table_year.html
[https://perma.cc/GP9K-75WA].
15
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS, BULLETIN
NO. 45, Capital Punishment 1930-1968 (1969).
16
See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889 (1963).
17
See EVAN MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 28-29 (2013).
14
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Despite longstanding concerns about racial discrimination in the
administration of the death penalty and the efforts of the LDF and others
to highlight such discrimination in litigation, the Supreme Court avoided
addressing racial discrimination as a basis for restricting the death
penalty. In the mid-1960s, the Court declined to review a challenge to the
death penalty resting on the LDF’s empirical study showing a powerful
linkage between race and the death penalty in rape cases. 18 When the
Court invalidated prevailing statutes in Furman v. Georgia in 1972, the
Justices supporting that result tended to highlight general “arbitrariness”
rather than racial discrimination. In 1977, when the Court found the death
penalty excessive as applied to rape, it chose the (rare) case of a white
offender who had been sentenced to death and said nothing about the role
of racial discrimination in such cases. 19
In 1987, in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court finally addressed directly the
claim that the racially discriminatory operation of the death penalty
violates the Constitution.20 The death-sentenced inmate presented a
sophisticated statistical analysis, the Baldus study, which found that race
played a significant role in capital outcomes in post-Furman Georgia,
particularly the race of victims. The Court assumed for purposes of
decision that the study was sound. Yet the Court declined to give relief,
holding that the defendant could not rely on evidence of systematic racial
discrimination and instead must offer proof of discrimination in his own
case.21 The Court indicated that allowing such statistical evidence to
provide the basis of a constitutional claim would open the door to
challenges based on other types of discrimination; it also suggested that it
could not confine a decision granting relief to capital defendants and that
a ruling for McCleskey would therefore threaten the operation of the
entire criminal justice system.22
The Court’s rejection of systemic racial discrimination as grounds for
challenging capital punishment makes it unlikely that the Court would
frame constitutional abolition primarily in such terms. The unlikeliness
of race-based abolition is reflected and reinforced by the appearance of a
case on the Court’s docket this Term. In Buck v. Davis, the Court refused
to allow a capital sentence to stand where defense counsel put on an expert
who indicated that the defendant was more likely to be dangerous because

18
See Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 267 (1970) (limiting grant of certiorari to claims
regarding standardless discretion and the unitary structure of the capital trial and refusing
to accept review of the racial discrimination claim).
19
See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977).
20
See 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987).
21
See id. at 292.
22
See id. at 314–17.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss3/3

Steiker and Steiker: Abolishing the American Death Penalty: The Court of Public Opinio

2017]

Death Penalty Abolition

585

he is black.23 That such a question remained open to argument in 2016
suggests how far the Court is from finding racial discrimination as a basis
for wholesale constitutional rejection of capital punishment.
The Court’s reluctance to focus on race in its capital jurisprudence
stems from several considerations. First, the Court faces the problem of
measuring the impact of race on the capital system and deciding how
much impact is constitutionally intolerable. In Justice Lewis Powell’s
initial draft of the majority opinion in McCleskey, he criticized the Baldus
study and left open the possibility that a more persuasive empirical
demonstration of racial bias might require judicial relief. Justice Antonin
Scalia objected to this approach, wanting to avoid endless litigation
involving sophisticated studies beyond the grasp of most lawyers and
judges.24 The McCleskey litigation reveals the institutional limits of courts
in understanding, distilling, and applying the results of social science in
constitutional litigation. Moreover, even when courts are able to
confidently assess the impact of race on capital decision-making, it
remains difficult for those courts to determine when a state system has
crossed the constitutional line. States likely will vary in the extent to
which racial discrimination infects capital decision-making. If systemic
racial discrimination is a cognizable claim, courts will have to develop
manageable, non-arbitrary standards for assessing such claims. Studies
confined geographically to one jurisdiction (or a small number of
jurisdictions), or temporally to a particular span of time, are unlikely to
provide the Court sufficient grounds for permanent abolition throughout
the United States.
Second and relatedly, the Court is much more comfortable regulating
criminal justice procedures than criminal justice outcomes. The Court can
encourage or require states to adopt safeguards to minimize the impact of
racial discrimination (such as policing the use of racially discriminatory
strikes in jury selection), but the Court does not have the tools to ensure
equal outcomes. Moreover, in McCleskey, the Court highlighted the fact
that one of the important safeguards in capital cases—the ability of juries
to reject the death penalty based on mitigating circumstances—actually
undercuts the equality of outcomes, because a commitment to discretion
in capital cases entails the possibility that such discretion will be exercised
in arbitrary or invidious ways.25

Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. _____ (2017).
Justice Antonin Scalia, Memorandum to the Conference Re: No. 84-6811-McCleskey v.
Kemp (Jan. 6, 1987), available at Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers, McCleskey
v. Kemp file (“Memorandum from Scalia”).
25
See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 302–03.
23
24
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Third, the Court has been loath to treat racial discrimination as
beyond repair in other constitutional contexts. In its desegregation and
affirmative action cases, the Court emphasized that remedies should be
structured with an end date in mind, in part based on the Court’s belief
that racial discrimination is surmountable. 26 Given this confidence in the
eventual decline in the effects of past discrimination, the Court is unlikely
to throw up its hands and declare the death penalty unconstitutional
based on evidence of lingering racial discrimination in capital cases. Such
a concession in the capital context would have destabilizing consequences
for its broader approach to racial discrimination in other contexts, many
of which have a greater pull on the Court’s attention and resources.
Finally, the remedy of abolition appears to be ill-suited to the problem
of racial discrimination that the Baldus study and other studies have
identified. The most pronounced manifestation of racial discrimination in
Georgia was the unwillingness of prosecutors and jurors to seek or return
capital verdicts in minority victim cases. This sort of under-enforcement
would be most naturally addressed by increasing capital prosecutions in
such circumstances; abolition would not necessarily increase solicitude for
minority victims or rectify the imbalanced response to their victimization.
Thus, even though racial discrimination has been and remains a
ubiquitous problem in the administration of the death penalty and
concerns about racial discrimination motivated the campaign to restrict
capital punishment both within and outside of the Court, the Court is
unlikely to abolish the death penalty primarily on such grounds. The
Court’s decisions provide extremely limited tools for attacking capital
punishment as racially discriminatory, and the Court has said remarkably
little about race and the death penalty despite abundant opportunities to
do so.
B. Wrongful Convictions
Fear of executing innocents is likely as old as the death penalty itself.
Many abolitionist jurisdictions around the world, including Great Britain,
were motivated to abolish in part by high-profile wrongful convictions
and/or executions.27 In the United States, concerns about innocence have
surfaced at various times with various levels of urgency. The late 1990s
marked the beginning of an era of unprecedented anxiety about the
problem of wrongful convictions. Technological advances in DNA
analysis made it possible to assess scores of cases with preserved DNA,
26
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (asserting that affirmative action
should no longer be necessary in university admissions decisions in twenty-five years).
27
See ROGER HOOD & CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE
54–55 (5th ed. 2015).
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and the results were disheartening.
Testing revealed numerous
wrongfully convicted inmates in both capital and non-capital cases. A
new cottage industry of “innocence projects” emerged to revisit
convictions with the benefit of new technology as well as new insights into
the factors leading to wrongful conviction.
The most troubling spate of exonerations occurred in Illinois, with the
discovery of more than a dozen wrongfully condemned men on a death
row that housed fewer than 200 inmates. The Illinois experience triggered
intensive media coverage of the “exoneration” phenomenon and deeper
examination of the causes of inaccurate verdicts. One predictable source
of error was police and/or prosecutorial misconduct, but studies also
revealed endemic problems with evidence long regarded as reliable, at
least by the public at large: eyewitness testimony and confessions. The
experience in Illinois led Republican Governor George Ryan to declare a
moratorium on executions in 2000 based on his “grave concerns about our
state’s shameful record of convicting innocent people and putting them
on death row.”28 The moratorium was followed three years later by
Governor Ryan’s grant of mass clemency to everyone on death row and
eleven years later by Illinois’s decision to abolish the death penalty.
Concerns about wrongful convictions have contributed substantially
to the decline in the American death penalty over the past fifteen years.
The issue was central in the debates culminating in the legislative repeal
of capital statutes in New Jersey, New Mexico, Illinois, Connecticut,
Maryland, and Nebraska (whose capital statute was reinstated by
referendum in November of 2016). Many observers also credit concerns
about innocence with contributing substantially to the remarkable decline
in death sentences—from over 300 a year in the mid-1990s to just 30 in the
most recent year.
But the resonance of concerns about innocence with the general public
is not reflected in prevailing constitutional doctrine. For the past fifty
years, the Supreme Court has extensively regulated state criminal
processes. The Court has applied against the states virtually all of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights concerning the investigation and
prosecution of a crime, including the prohibition of unreasonable searches
and seizures, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right against
compelled self-incrimination, the right to counsel, the right to a jury trial,
and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. All of these
guarantees were designed to constrain the federal government, but the
28
Governor Ryan Declares Moratorium on Executions, Will Appoint Commission to Review
Capital Punishment System, ILL. GOV’T NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 31, 2000),
http://www3.illinois.gov/PressReleases/showpressrelease.cfm?subjectid=3&recnum=359
[https://perma.cc/4QZC-P6BR].
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Court held in a series of cases that these protections were essential aspects
of due process secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore
applicable against state criminal justice actors.29 As a result of these
decisions, federal courts routinely address claims that state police or
prosecutors have violated basic procedural protections.
Despite the enormous expansion of federal constitutional protections
in state criminal cases, the Court has declined to provide any specific
protection for inmates who claim to have suffered wrongful conviction
apart from the minimal requirement that the evidence at trial be sufficient
to establish all elements of the convicted offense. In 1993, the issue came
to the Court in a stark fashion, when Leonel Herrera, a Texas deathsentenced inmate, presented new evidence that his brother had committed
the offense for which Herrera had been sentenced to die.30 Under Texas
law, such evidence had to be presented within thirty days of trial, and
after that period, an inmate was forever barred from claiming wrongful
conviction in court. Because Herrera’s evidence came outside that
deadline, the state court refused even to look at the evidence or consider
the claim. When Herrera filed a federal habeas corpus petition claiming
that Texas had violated the Constitution by not considering his new
evidence, the lower federal courts held that claims of “bare-innocence”—
resting on newly-discovered evidence of innocence without evidence of a
separate constitutional violation, such as prosecutorial misconduct—are
not cognizable in federal court. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to address
Herrera’s claim but ultimately withheld relief, suggesting strongly that
claims of wrongful conviction should be directed not to the courts but to
executive clemency. The Court declined to decide whether, as Herrera
provocatively framed the question for review, the Constitution prohibits
the execution of an innocent person. 31
More than two decades post-Herrera, the Court has yet to embrace the
proposition that a condemned inmate with newly-discovered, airtight
evidence of his innocence has a constitutional right to judicial relief. Given
the Court’s reticence to embrace this basic claim of an individual who
asserts his innocence based on new evidence, it is unsurprising that courts
have been unreceptive to the much broader assertion that the general
unreliability of the death penalty is a reason to condemn the punishment
in all cases. One exception, coming on the heels of the experience in
Illinois, was the decision of a federal judge in 2002 to invalidate the federal
death penalty based on an intolerable risk of wrongful conviction and
29
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 147–48 (1968).
30
See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993).
31
See id. at 398.
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execution.32 The opinion, citing the recent spate of exonerations, declared
that “[w]e now know, in a way almost unthinkable even a decade ago, that
our system of criminal justice, for all its protections, is sufficiently fallible
that innocent people are convicted of capital crimes with some
frequency.”33 The opinion suggested that the death penalty cut off the
possibility of discovering and vindicating claims of actual innocence. But
that decision was promptly reversed, with the federal appellate court
noting that nothing in the Court’s jurisprudence suggested a
constitutional right “to a continued opportunity for exoneration
throughout the course of one’s natural life.”34
What accounts for the courts’ unwillingness to transform concern
about erroneous convictions and executions into a cognizable
constitutional claim? One threshold problem is defining what counts as a
wrongful conviction. Is a conviction “wrongful” if later evidence simply
undermines proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Under that
approach, an inmate would be deemed “wrongfully convicted” even if it
were more likely than not that he was in fact guilty, so long as new
evidence creates at least some reasonable doubt. Or should “wrongful
conviction” attach only to cases in which an inmate affirmatively
establishes his innocence? The absence of an agreed-upon sense of
wrongful conviction undermines the possibility of consensus about the
magnitude of the phenomenon.
To structure an opinion around the prevalence of wrongful
convictions, courts would have to resolve this definitional problem. They
would also face the near-impossible task of gathering usable data of error
rates in capital cases. Such an undertaking would require deciding the
appropriate jurisdictional focus: should courts look at error at the county
level, state level, or national level? Even if a court could surmount these
obstacles—deciding what counts as a wrongful execution, amassing data
appropriate to the definition, and choosing the governmental unit to be
assessed—it would then have to determine how much error is
constitutionally intolerable. As in the racial discrimination context
described above, courts would face the complicated (and perhaps
unseemly) job of quantifying constitutionally acceptable rates of error (if,
say, a one percent error rate were operative and acceptable, we would
expect to have had fifteen or so wrongful executions since executions
resumed in 1977).
Apart from these practical problems, a claim centered on the risk of
wrongful execution raises conceptual problems as well. Why is wrongful
32
33
34

See United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Id. at 420.
United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2002).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 3 [2017], Art. 3

590

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

execution worse than wrongful incarceration? Many people argue that
errors can be discovered and corrected if an inmate is sentenced to lengthy
incarceration, but there are reasons to believe that errors are more likely
to be detected in cases where an inmate is sentenced to death. Non-capital
inmates ordinarily have no right to counsel in state or federal postconviction proceedings, whereas capital inmates are generally afforded
such representation. An unrepresented innocent inmate is unlikely to
exert the legal and political pressure necessary to overturn or commute
his sentence. The high visibility of capital cases also makes it much more
likely that media will be drawn to claims of innocence asserted by deathsentenced inmates. Hence, even though executed inmates lose their
opportunity for vindication once executed, their pre-execution
opportunities for vindication are generally vastly superior to their noncapital counterparts, which suggests that their overall chance of
vindication might be more substantial.
Along similar lines, the notion that errors are “irrevocable” in death
cases but fixable on the non-capital side rests on the implausible
assumption that incarcerated inmates can be made whole in the rare cases
where their innocence is uncovered and vindicated. Time lost during
wrongful incarceration is not recoverable. An inmate who spends twentyfive years wrongfully imprisoned can have some semblance of a life after
vindication, but the wrongful punishment he or she endured cannot be
undone.
More broadly, the Court’s reluctance to construct a constitutional
jurisprudence responsive to the problems of wrongful conviction and
execution reflects the distinctively American preoccupation with
procedural rather than substantive justice. Wrongful conviction in the
United States means conviction in violation of the rules, not innocence of
the underlying offense. The American attraction to procedural justice is
rooted in part in the Constitution itself, which speaks in terms of due
process and prohibits certain practices rather than guarantees substantive
justice (apart, perhaps, from the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments). The American adversarial system is premised on the
notion that substantive justice is achieved when zealous advocates for the
state and the defendant fairly present their sides in court. The use of lay
jurors, the exclusion of relevant evidence obtained in violation of
constitutional rules, and the circumscribed review of jury verdicts all
reveal the limited commitment to accuracy in trial outcomes as opposed to
the robust commitment to fair competition in court. This longstanding
commitment to proceduralism in American criminal justice explains the
unwillingness of the Court in Herrera to constitutionalize a right to be free
from execution if new evidence suggests innocence. It also portends the
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limited prospects for constitutional abolition of the death penalty resting
on the risk of wrongful execution.
C. Human Dignity
Throughout American history, opponents of the American death
penalty have offered numerous critiques regarding its wisdom as public
policy. During the era of public executions, critics cited the coarsening
effects of such spectacles. In later years, opponents pointed to the absence
of proven deterrent effects, its arbitrary and discriminatory
implementation, and the risk of error. More recently, opponents tend to
highlight the increased financial costs associated with capital punishment,
which vastly exceed the cost of non-capital proceedings (even when
combined with the cost of lengthy—even lifetime—incarceration).
Despite the ubiquity of these pragmatic challenges, one suspects that the
opposition of those most committed to abolition rests on concerns about
the fundamental morality of the practice—separate and apart from
deficiencies in its administration. Some base their moral objections to
capital punishment on religious grounds, such as Quakers and Catholics.
Since the founding, many of those who oppose the death penalty on
secular grounds have deemed it inconsistent with human dignity. The
claim from human dignity appears in many forms, including the claim
that capital punishment denies the humanity or redemptive capacity of
the offender, constitutes excessive cruelty, is incompatible with
democracy, or establishes an inappropriate relation between state and
citizen. Outside of the United States, the argument based on human
dignity is by far the most commonly invoked ground for opposing capital
punishment, both in countries that have abolished it and in those on the
brink of abolition. In the contemporary abolition movement, the
arguments from religion and human dignity are often complementary, as
reflected in the Vatican’s declaration that the death penalty is “an affront
to human dignity.”35
Despite the prominence of the human dignity argument among
ardent abolitionists both here and abroad, the argument has been largely
absent in most American constitutional discourse. In the few cases
challenging capital practices that made their way to the Supreme Court in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which focused primarily on
particular methods of execution, the Court ruled that capital punishment
was not cruel in the constitutional sense so long as it did not involve
See Vatican Says Death Penalty is “Affront to Human Dignity,” DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.
(Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/vatican-says-death-penalty-affronthuman-dignity [https://perma.cc/43Y4-G6R4.].

35
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“something more than the mere extinguishment of life.”36 Even when an
inmate complained that it was constitutionally excessive to electrocute
him a second time after the first attempted electrocution failed, the Court
refused to intervene, stating that “[a]ccidents happen for which no man is
to blame,” and “[t]he traditional humanity of modern Anglo–American
law” forbids only “unnecessary pain in the execution of the death
sentence.”37
When the Court addressed the claim in Furman v. Georgia that capital
punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment, the Justices focused on the administration of the death
penalty rather than its moral acceptability. Only Justice William Brennan
insisted that the death penalty violates human dignity, asserting that
capital punishment necessarily involves the state in the “denial of the
executed person’s humanity.”38 His colleagues, on the other hand,
directed their energies toward pragmatic considerations such as
deterrence, cost, error, and arbitrariness. Even Justice Thurgood Marshall,
who agreed with Justice Brennan that the death penalty should be deemed
unconstitutional in all cases, emphasized instrumental concerns such as
the lack of proven deterrent effect, the low recidivism rate of convicted
murderers, the cost, and the brutalization effects of executions. 39
When the Court upheld several capital statutes four years later, the
Court seemed to reject the notion that capital punishment is incompatible
with human dignity, holding that it can be justified on retributive or
deterrence grounds.40 Over the forty ensuing years, the debates about
capital punishment at the Court have focused almost exclusively on
pragmatic considerations, ranging from the adequacy of aggravating
factors, the ability of jurors to consider mitigating evidence, the
competence of trial counsel, discrimination in jury selection, and so on.
Occasionally in dissent, a Justice has noted the inhumanity of execution
methods or death–row confinement,41 but no member of the Court since
Justice Brennan has offered a sustained attack on capital punishment as
inconsistent with human dignity. Justice Stephen Breyer, who penned the
most comprehensive recent challenge to the American death penalty in
In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 426, 447 (1890).
Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462–63 (1947).
38
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
39
See id. at 362–63 (Marshall, J., concurring).
40
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183–87 (1976).
41
See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2797 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing
effects of long-term solitary confinement on death row); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 123 (2008)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing for constitutional protection in the lethal injection process
to ensure an inmate is unconscious so as to avoid risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary
pain).
36
37
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Glossip v. Gross, adhered to the largely instrumental critique of the
American practice, emphasizing its lack of reliability, arbitrariness in
administration, long delays between sentence and execution, and
declining use.42 Given the virtually complete absence of judicial focus on
human dignity in its hundreds of opinions addressing capital punishment
(including dissents), the Court is unlikely to reject the death penalty
primarily on such grounds.
The paucity of attention to human dignity concerns in capital
punishment discourse in the American courts stems from several factors.
As noted above, many of the protections in our Constitution are
procedural in nature. Even the Eighth Amendment provision regarding
“cruel” punishments requires that such punishments also be “unusual” to
be forbidden. Contrast, in this regard, France’s Declaration of the Rights
of Man and Citizen, drafted at roughly the same time, which includes the
pronouncement that “[t]he law ought to establish only penalties that are
strictly and obviously necessary.”43 The American constitutional tradition
scarcely mentions human dignity in many contexts where we might
expect to find such references, including cases involving freedom of
speech, freedom of religion, and racial justice. Only recently, in the
Court’s cases prohibiting the criminalization of homosexual sodomy and
sustaining the right of marriage for gay couples, does the Court appear to
invoke human dignity as a primary ground for decision. 44
More recent national constitutions, especially those framed after the
horrors of the Holocaust or apartheid, explicitly protect human dignity
and/or human life, providing a constitutional basis for abolition of the
death penalty even when there is no specific provision on the subject. In
addition, political alliances, like the European Union, reinforce human
dignity as a central political commitment, whereas the U.S. Supreme
Court has tended to interpret constitutional commitments to personal
liberty in a somewhat idiosyncratic and isolated manner (although, as
discussed below, this isolated approach is diminishing in the capital
context).
The unavailability of human dignity as a constitutional argument
likely also contributed to the capital litigation strategy pursued in the
See 135 S. Ct. at 2755–56 (2015) (Breyer, J. dissenting).
Bill Stuntz powerfully contrasts the American constitutional focus on procedural
protections with the more robust substantive guarantees of the roughly contemporaneous
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 76 (2011).
44
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (holding that the prohibition on
same-sex marriage “demeans gays and lesbians”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003)
(“The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime.”).
42
43
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1960s and 1970s. When the NAACP LDF formulated its attack on the
American death penalty, it decided to attack particular vulnerable
practices, such as death–qualified juries, wide discretion in capital
sentencing, and unitary sentencing procedures, rather than seeking
judicial condemnation of the death penalty as fundamentally unjust in the
abstract. Even when the LDF took the next step in challenging the
constitutionality of the death penalty as a whole, it emphasized aspects of
its administration rather than its inconsistency with human dignity. The
Court, in turn, framed its constitutional regulation in light of these
challenges, focusing exclusively on state death penalty practices rather
than the death penalty itself. The limited protection for human dignity in
the American constitutional tradition and the resulting strategic choices in
capital litigation created a path of dependence in which the American
death penalty continues to be contested on pragmatic, instrumental
grounds. Moreover, the Court’s resolutely pragmatic focus has likely
influenced death penalty discourse in the public sphere, marginalizing
further death penalty opposition rooted in deontological principle.
Outside of the Court, opponents of the death penalty have submerged
absolutist arguments against the death penalty to find common ground
with potential allies who do not share their foundational moral objections.
Such opponents have recast efforts to eliminate the death penalty as
“repeals” rather than “abolition” to avoid the moralism associated with
the latter. It is much easier to find common ground around issues of
wrongful conviction and cost than around the much more fraught
culture–war question whether states ought to be allowed to execute
heinous offenders. The United States has thus become an outlier beyond
its mere retention of the death penalty; it is an outlier in the diminishing
visibility of human dignity as a basis for death penalty opposition both on
and off the Court.
III. THE PATH TO CONSTITUTIONAL ABOLITION
Although arguments about race, innocence, and human dignity will
not likely provide a direct constitutional route to abolition of the death
penalty, they may nonetheless play a significant supporting role in what
we predict is the most likely path to constitutional invalidation of capital
punishment. The constitutional doctrine that the Supreme Court has
elaborated to address “excessive” or “disproportionate” punishment
under the Eighth Amendment is the most likely legal vehicle to lead to a
categorical constitutional abolition for a variety of reasons. This doctrine
is long–established and well–elaborated, and it has been used by the Court
recently in a series of cases yielding significant limitations on both the
death penalty and the sentence of life-without-parole. Moreover, Justice
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Anthony Kennedy, who has been a key swing vote on the Court, authored
several of these recent opinions elaborating the Eighth Amendment’s
proportionality principle. Finally, the Court’s proportionality doctrine is
capacious in terms of the kinds of evidence and arguments that it
encompasses, creating room for concerns about race, innocence, and
human dignity to play a supporting role in evaluating the constitutionality
of challenged punishment practices.
The Court’s proportionality doctrine had an early start, with its
essential outlines sketched in Gregg, the case that reinstated the death
penalty just four years after the Court had invalidated all prevailing
capital statutes in 1972 in the landmark Furman decision.45 In Gregg, the
Court explained that the Eighth Amendment prohibition of “cruel and
unusual punishments” requires consideration of whether a challenged
practice violates “the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”46 This latter phrase does not by its terms
offer much helpful direction, but the Gregg Court began to identify the
relevant criteria for gauging “evolving standards of decency.” First, the
Court looked to legislative enactments, noting that thirty–five states and
the federal government had enacted new death penalty statutes since
1972. The Court also considered the outcomes of individual sentencing
hearings, noting that more than 450 death sentences had been imposed
under the new statutes. In addition to this quantifiable evidence of
contemporary standards, the Court addressed what it identified as the
twin purposes of capital punishment—deterrence and retribution—and
concluded that these purposes could plausibly be served by reinstating
the practice of capital punishment under the revised statutory schemes.
Since 1976, the Court has increasingly fleshed out its Eighth
Amendment analysis, striking down both capital and non-capital
sentences that the Court found to violate “evolving standards of decency.”
Just one year after Gregg, the Court invalidated the death penalty for the
crime of the rape of an adult woman as “grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment” for such a crime.47 Once again, the Court started
with consideration of legislative enactments and jury verdicts, which
together constituted “objective evidence of the country’s present
judgment concerning the acceptability of death as a penalty.” 48 Georgia
was the only state that authorized the death penalty for the crime of rape,
and its juries had returned relatively few death sentences for rapists in the
years prior to the Court’s decision. But once again, the Court did not
45
46
47
48

See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 154.
Id. at 173 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
Id. at 593.
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restrict its analysis to quantitative evidence, explaining that “the
Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment.”49 By “our own judgment,” the Court was
not suggesting that the Justices invoke their own moral or policy
preferences, but rather that they consider—as they had done in Gregg—
whether the challenged practice promoted the deterrent and retributive
purposes of capital punishment. The Court concluded that death was a
disproportionate punishment for someone who had not taken a life
because such a sentence ran afoul of the basic retributive command of
proportionality.
The Court applied the same reasoning to strike down the death
penalty for defendants convicted of felony murder for killings that they
personally did not commit or assist or intend to take place, but rather that
were committed by a codefendant in a joint felony. 50 The Court later
restricted its felony-murder exemption to those defendants who played
only a minor role in the criminal undertaking or who lacked reckless
disregard for the possibility that life might be taken. 51 In both of its
decisions regarding the death penalty for felony murder, the Court
performed the same two–step analysis outlined above: (1) it considered
“objective evidence” of society’s views such as legislative enactments and
jury verdicts; and (2) it consulted its “own judgment” by considering
whether the purposes of deterrence and retribution were served by the
practice in question.
For a period of almost two decades, from the mid-1980s until the early
2000s, the Court did not strike down any punishment practices under the
Eighth Amendment, and indeed, it rejected two challenges to the death
penalty brought by juvenile offenders and offenders with intellectual
disability in 1989.52 It seemed to many that the Court’s proportionality
doctrine had hit a wall beyond which it might not progress further. But
starting in 2002, the doctrine took on new life and momentum as the Court
used it five times in a ten–year period to limit the reach of both the death
penalty and the sentence of life–without–parole. In this series of five
cases, the Court entrenched and elaborated its Eighth Amendment
doctrine, expounding upon—and expanding—the evidence relevant to
discerning “evolving standards of decency.”

Id. at 597.
See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
51
See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 137 (1987).
52
See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 336–37 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
368 (1989).
49
50
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In its 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court struck down the
death penalty for offenders with an intellectual disability.53 In this case,
the objective evidence was not nearly so stark as it had been with regard
to the death penalty for rape. Twenty of the thirty-eight states that
authorized the death penalty permitted the execution of offenders with an
intellectual disability, while only eighteen prohibited it. The Court
nonetheless found a legislative consensus against the practice by adding
the twelve abolitionist states to the count, thus yielding a legislative
majority of thirty states rejecting the practice, with only twenty states
accepting it. But the Court noted that even on the “objective” side of its
analysis, raw numbers did not rule; rather, the Court explained, “[i]t is not
so much the number of [states exempting offenders with an intellectual
disability] that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of
change.”54 It was significant to the Court that sixteen of the eighteen states
that prohibited the execution of offenders with intellectual disabilities had
done so within the thirteen years prior to the Court’s decision and that no
state had withdrawn such an exemption in the same period. Thus, the
Court’s objective analysis looks to recent history and emerging trends, not
only to legislative head counts.
Moreover, the Atkins Court offered an even more expansive
elaboration of its objective analysis by considering, albeit in a footnote,
evidence of “a much broader social and professional consensus.” 55 The
Court explained that its conclusion about national consensus was
supported by the views of expert organizations, representatives of diverse
religious communities, the world community, and the general public
(expressed through polling data). The Court’s willingness to consult such
a wide variety of sources to establish whether a societal consensus had
emerged was a game-changing moment in Eighth Amendment law. No
longer was the “objective evidence” of “evolving standards of decency”
primarily grounded in legislative nose counting. Rather, such evidence
was qualitative as well as quantitative. The significance of this analytical
shift was reflected in the vehemence of the dissent it engendered. Justice
Scalia was scathing in his repudiation of the Court’s analysis, even
bestowing upon it a sarcastic award: “[T]he Prize for the Court’s Most
Feeble Effort to fabricate ‘national consensus’ must go to its appeal
(deservedly relegated to a footnote) to the views of assorted professional
and religious organizations, members of the so-called ‘world community,’
and respondents to opinion polls.”56
53
54
55
56

See 536 U.S. 304, 306 (2002).
Id. at 344.
Id. at 316 n.21.
Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Objective evidence aside, the Atkins Court also found that its own
judgment called for an exemption from the death penalty for offenders
with intellectual disabilities, because such offenders were less culpable for
their offenses and less likely to be deterred. In bringing its own judgment
to bear, the Court also emphasized a wholly new consideration: it noted
that offenders with intellectual disabilities in the aggregate “face a special
risk of wrongful execution” because of their susceptibility to giving false
confessions, their lessened ability to consult with counsel, their possibly
inappropriate affect at trial, and the risk that juries will consider them
more dangerous because of their disability. For the first time, concerns
about innocence became an explicit part of the Court’s proportionality
analysis.
Three years later, the Court—per Justice Anthony Kennedy—
underscored the expansive approach it had adopted in Atkins when it
struck down the death penalty for juvenile offenders in Roper v. Simmons
in 2005.57 Expert opinion was the centerpiece of the Simmons Court’s
analysis, as the Court emphasized the wealth of scientific and sociological
studies that revealed how different adolescents are from adults in terms
of maturity, self-control, and susceptibility to peer influences, and how
much more transitory and less fixed is the adolescent personality. The
Court explained that these proven qualities of youth make juvenile
offenders less culpable for their offenses (thus undermining the goal of
retribution) and make it less likely that juveniles can be deterred by the
threat of a death sentence (thus undermining the goal of deterrence). The
Court also took the occasion to give full-throated voice to the significance
of the views of the world community. Justice Kennedy forcefully and
dramatically emphasized the appropriateness of consulting the
experience and views of other nations: “It does not lessen our fidelity to
the Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express
affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples
simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own
heritage of freedom.”58
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court again three years later when the
Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional for the crime of raping
a child in Kennedy v. Louisiana in 2008.59 The objective evidence of
consensus against the use of capital punishment in this context was strong,
given that only a handful of states had passed laws punishing child rape
with death, and Louisiana was the only one that had actually sentenced
anyone to death for such a crime since 1964. Although the case would
57
58
59

See 543 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2005).
Id. at 578.
See 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008).
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have been easy to dispose of on the objective numbers alone, the Court
spoke more broadly, explaining that death is an excessive punishment for
any interpersonal crime that does not involve the taking of life, simply as
a matter of retributive justice. Moreover, the Court again adverted to the
problem of innocence, noting “serious systemic concerns in prosecuting
child rape,” including the documented problem of unreliable child
testimony, which can create a “special risk of wrongful execution.” 60 The
Kennedy Court introduced yet another concern regarding the extension of
the death penalty to the crime of child rape, observing that sentencing
juries would have little guidance in choosing the few cases deserving of
death from the regrettably large numbers of rape cases involving child
victims. As a result, explained the Court, “we have no confidence that the
imposition of the death penalty would not be so arbitrary as to be
“freakis[h].”61 The Court made no specific mention of the possibility of
racial discrimination, even though the issue had been raised extensively
in the briefing of the case. But the Court’s use of the word “freakish” and
accompanying citation to Furman constituted a strong gesture in that
direction. The Furman Court’s use of words like “freakish,” “wanton,”
and “arbitrary” were widely read as code for the risk of racial
discrimination; at the time of the decision, “everyone understood Furman
as having been about race.”62
The Court’s commitment to its Eighth Amendment proportionality
doctrine is illustrated by the extension and further elaboration of that
doctrine in the noncapital context. The Court used the principles that it
developed in the series of capital cases described above to limit the
imposition of the noncapital sentence of life-without-parole (“LWOP”) on
juvenile offenders. In Graham v. Florida, the Court constitutionally barred
the imposition of LWOP sentences on juvenile offenders who had
The Court held that its
committed nonhomicide offenses. 63
proportionality doctrine, although developed in the context of capital
cases, is the proper legal rubric for consideration of all “categorical”
Eighth Amendment claims—that is, for Eighth Amendment challenges to
a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders. In
addition to its detailed consideration of objective evidence such as
legislative authorization and actual sentences imposed, the Court
emphasized the special status of youth, reiterating its analysis from Roper

Id. at 443.
Id. (citing Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Furman).
62
MANDERY, supra note 17, at 276.
63
See 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010). The Court extended its holding in Graham two years later,
holding that juvenile homicide offenders could not receive mandatory life-without-parole
(“LWOP”) sentences. See Miller v. Alabama, 132, S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
60
61
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v. Simmons, the case outlawing the juvenile death penalty. 64 Also
consistent with its approach in Simmons, the Court underscored the
significance of world opinion, noting, “the United States is the only Nation
that imposes life without parole sentences on juvenile nonhomicide
offenders.”65
The Graham Court also drew on the part of its analysis in Kennedy v.
Louisiana that had raised concerns about “freakish” application of the
death penalty in the context of child rape in light of the broad discretion
afforded capital sentencing juries. Raising a similar concern about
accuracy in LWOP sentencing, the Graham Court explained that a
categorical rule exempting juveniles from LWOP sentences in nonhomicide cases was necessary because decision-making in this context is
too potentially arbitrary, allowing the imposition of an LWOP sentence on
a juvenile “[b]ased only on a discretionary, subjective judgment by a judge
or jury that the offender is irredeemably depraved.”66 The Court
concluded: “A categorical rule avoids the risk that . . . a court or jury will
erroneously conclude that a particular juvenile is sufficiently culpable to
deserve life without parole for a nonhomicide.”67 Although the Court did
not explicitly raise the issue of racial discrimination (though here, too, it
was extensively briefed), the Court’s concern that discretionary judgments
about “depravity” might be unreliable implicitly speaks to concerns about
discrimination.
The hundreds of pages of Supreme Court opinions elaborating the
Eighth Amendment’s proportionality doctrine have transformed what
might have remained a largely quantitative analysis of consensus-bynumbers into a much broader, more qualitative assessment of emerging
societal trends. This doctrine is not a likely vehicle for claims of factual
innocence, challenges to racial discrimination, or elaboration of the
meaning of human dignity. Nonetheless, there is room in the newly
capacious proportionality analysis for consideration of each of these
disparate issues, and thus each may play a role in a future global challenge
to capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
The objective, quantitative evidence of a growing consensus against
the death penalty is becoming stronger with each passing year. In the past
decade, six states have repealed their death penalty laws, a rate that is
unprecedented in recent history. Moreover, in the past two years, two
state supreme courts have declared their state’s death penalties
unconstitutional, bringing the number of states without death penalty
64
65
66
67

See Graham, 560 U.S. at 91–92.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78–79.
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statutes to nineteen, with another eleven states reaching essentially “de
facto abolitionist” status, having not performed any executions in a
decade.68 Even more striking is the decline in use of the death penalty on
the ground, with both executions and new death sentences falling off
dramatically from late 1990s highs. While this powerful quantitative case
for an emerging consensus against capital punishment in America will no
doubt be the starting point for an Eighth Amendment categorical
challenge to the death penalty, the constitutional analysis will not end
there, as the Court has repeatedly emphasized that other considerations
are relevant to the question. Concerns about race, innocence, and human
dignity all can be addressed within this broader analysis.
Although the Court has declined to expressly invoke concerns about
racial discrimination in its Eighth Amendment analysis, there are two
ways in which such concerns may yet play a part in an Eighth Amendment
challenge to the death penalty. First, as noted above, the Court has
repeatedly raised concerns about “freakish” or “erroneous” sentencing
determinations arising from inadequately fettered discretion. In both
Kennedy and Graham, these concerns played an explicit part in the Court’s
Eighth Amendment invalidation of the challenged sentences (the death
penalty for child rape in Kennedy and LWOP for juvenile nonhomicide
offenders in Graham). Evidence of racially discriminatory patterns in
capital sentencing thus may be relevant to a constitutional challenge to
capital punishment—not to “prove” intentional discrimination in a
particular case (proof that was required and not found by the Court in
McCleskey), but rather to demonstrate the inadequacy of the capital justice
system’s constraints on sentencing discretion. 69 Second, when the Court
brings its “own judgment” to bear as part of its Eighth Amendment
analysis, it asks whether the practice at issue serves the purposes of
retribution or deterrence. If death sentences are meted out on the basis or
arbitrary or invidious characteristics of the offender (like race or ethnicity),
then by definition, the death penalty is not being imposed according to
offenders’ just desserts, and thus runs afoul of the core principle of
retributive justice. Evidence of racially discriminatory patterns in capital
sentencing is directly relevant to whether the death penalty meets
retributive goals as practiced, rather than in abstract theory.
In his 2015 dissent in Glossip v. Gross, Justice Breyer counted eleven states as de facto
abolitionist because they had not conducted executions in more than eight years. Ten of
those eleven states remain abolitionist today. One of those states, Arkansas, has since
resumed executions, but the de facto abolitionist count remains at eleven because Nebraska,
which Justice Breyer treated as a seventh repeal jurisdiction, reinstated its death penalty but
has not conducted an execution in two decades. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2773,
2778 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
69
See 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
68
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The Supreme Court has been reluctant to authorize a federal judicial
forum for death row inmates to bring individual claims of factual
innocence based on new evidence discovered after trial. 70 But the Court
has been quite willing to raise concerns about innocence in bringing its
“own judgment” to bear on the constitutionality of challenged death
penalty practices. It has raised concerns about the potential for wrongful
conviction of offenders with intellectual disabilities because of the
difficulties their disabilities raise in the investigation and trial contexts.
Similarly, it has raised concerns about the potential wrongful conviction
of offenders charged with child rape because of the unreliability of child
testimony. In this way, evidence of a heightened risk of wrongful
convictions in capital cases, which has been documented by scholars, may
play a significant role in the Court’s evaluation of the constitutionality of
the death penalty, wholly apart from the Court’s analysis of the objective
evidence of its declining use. But innocence may also come into play on
the objective side of the Court’s analysis, because concerns about
innocence have been one of the most powerful forces driving both the
legislative repeal movement and the declining use of the death penalty on
the ground.71 Innocence thus explains the dramatic decline in the raw
numbers and suggests that this decline is not a temporary blip but rather
an enduring feature of the landscape of capital punishment.
Finally, there is also a role for invocations of human dignity in the
Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis. At a semantic level, the Court has
frequently intoned, “The basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”72 At a realpolitik
level, Justice Kennedy has shown great interest in the concept of dignity,
raising it in contexts as diverse as same-sex marriage and restrictions on
abortion rights.73 Given the results of the 2016 election and the
confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch, it is unclear whether or for how long
Justice Kennedy will continue to play a role as swing Justice on the Court.
But concerns about dignity may enter the Court’s Eighth Amendment
analysis in yet a different way. The Court has reiterated, first in a footnote
in Atkins and then in the text of both Simmons and Graham, that the views
of the world community play a role in establishing an emerging Eighth
See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469 (1996); Richard C. Dieter, Innocence and the Death Penalty:
The Increasing Danger of Executing the Innocent, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (1997),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/523?scid=45&did=292 [https://perma.cc/X2JB6HHA].
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Amendment consensus. The fact that all of our peer countries—all of the
other Western democracies—have abolished capital punishment, and for
quite some time now, is thus undeniably relevant to the Court’s
consideration of the objective evidence of consensus. While the views of
other nations are not dispositive of the Eighth Amendment question, the
Court has maintained that a uniform perspective abroad “underscores”
the centrality of certain rights in our own constitutional system. Our
closest peers in the world—the countries of Western Europe—abolished
capital punishment not for the pragmatic reasons that now dominate the
American debate (e.g., discrimination, innocence, cost), but rather
primarily on grounds of human dignity, which plays a much greater role
in European criminal justice discourse than in our own. 74 Thus, concerns
about human dignity may be smuggled onto less hospitable American soil
through consideration of the views of our European peers.
IV. CONCLUSION
The issues that any concerned citizen would raise about the American
death penalty are not the same issues that the U.S. Supreme Court will
most likely address under the Constitution in response to a categorical
challenge to capital punishment. Nonetheless, concerns about racial
discrimination, innocence, and respect for human dignity can and likely
will play a role, albeit a supporting and/or indirect one, in the Eighth
Amendment rubric that the Court will most likely bring to bear on the
question. At a broader level, however, these concerns will come into play
in an atmospheric as well as an analytic fashion. Should the U.S. Supreme
Court take up a categorical Eighth Amendment challenge to capital
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, the real question will be
whether the Court’s forty-year project to regulate and rationalize the most
extreme penal sanction under the Constitution has succeeded (well
enough) or failed. By raising the issues of discrimination, innocence, and
dignity, litigants will essentially be arguing that the regulatory project has
failed—and, indeed, was perhaps an impossible mission from the very
start.
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